Georgia Supreme Court -- Election Decisions

On Monday, the Georgia Supreme Court issued seven more opinions, including the much awaited decision on the Photo ID case, a case about a Randoph County Board of Commissioners election, and another case involving elections for the Carroll County Board of Education -- just in time for special elections coming up as early as Tuesday June 17. This post covers these election-related decisions -- even though none were decided on substantive grounds.

First, in Perdue v. Lake, an appeal of the injunction issued by a superior court against the enforcement of the 2006 version of the act requiring a photo ID to vote, the Georgia Supreme Court found that plaintiff Lake did not have standing to challenge the act.

As of the date of filing, Lake was a first-time voter, which the court indicated would have allowed her to vote without presenting a photo ID. After the complaint was filed, however, she voted in the July 2006 primary, so she no longer fit into the "first-time voter" category and would have been required to show photo ID to vote. The court reasoned that Lake was required to demonstrate standing as of the filing of the complaint, not based on events subsequent to the filing of the complaint, and thus did not have standing to challenge the act.

Additionally, Lake had a photo ID that permitted her to use the public transportation facilities for disabled individuals offered by MARTA. According to the court, Lake conceded at trial the legal issue of whether MARTA was an "entity of the State of Georgia ... authorized by law to issue personal identification." Thus, the court found that she would be permitted to use the MARTA ID to vote, and accordingly did not have standing on that basis as well. (Disclosure: BME represents plaintiffs in the parallel federal lawsuit challenging the Photo ID law.)

In Randolph County et al. v. Johnson, the Georgia Supreme Court found the case moot because the election at issue had already occurred. Johnson filed a nomination petition for re-election to the Randolph County Board of Commissioners. After the DOJ precleared Georgia, the elections superintendent found an insufficiency in the nomination petition and scheduled a hearing for 6 days before the general election. Johnson succeeded in obtaining a writ of prohibition to prevent the hearing, and also succeeded in winning re-election. (Bar exam question: what does a "writ of prohibition" accomplish and why was it the correct remedy here?) The Georgia Supreme Court said it was well-established that, once an individual's name is placed on the ballot and he wins election, the election cannot be contested on the grounds that the candidate did not comply with nomination requirements. It went on to find that this situation was not likely to repeat, nor would it necessarily evade review.

Finally, in Brooks v. Brown, et al. (and in keeping with today's theme), the Georgia Supreme Court also dismissed an election dispute as moot. HB 1600 reorganized Carroll County's Board of Elections, redrawing districts in the process and thus requiring preclearance from the DOJ. The DOJ did not issue a preclearance letter until July 19, 2006, the day after the date when special elections were supposed to have occurred under the terms of HB 1600. The Election Supervisor obtained a declaratory judgment authorizing the election to occur instead in conjunction with the November general election, and also obtained an ex parte order to open qualifying for the election in August 2006.

One of the candidates appealed on the ground that the superior court did not have the authority to "rewrite" HB 1600 and that the ex parte order was improper, but the Georgia Supreme Court found the dispute moot since, like in the Randolph County case, the election had already occurred. However, the court admonished the county for pursuing, and the trial court for issuing, an improper ex parte order in violation of Uniform Superior Court Rule 4.1.